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Foreword 
Poverty and informed reasoning
Amartya Sen
Lying in his death bed in 1776, David Hume wrote a moving 
letter of good-bye to Madame Bouflers, with whom he was 
almost certainly in love. «I see death approach gradually 
without any anxiety or regret,» wrote Hume to the Comtesse, 
adding, «I salute you, with great affection and regard, for the 
last time.» It is hard to think that Hume would not have, at 
that time, looked nostalgically also at the world of ideas and 
relections, to which too he was saying goodbye, and with 
which he was also certainly much in love. Hume was deeply 
involved in analyzing and investigating our knowledge of the 
external world–his contributions to epistemology would 
transform the subject–but he was no less interested in scruti-
nizing our internal world of feelings, morals and reasoning.
When this engaging collection of essays, to be published 
in the new–but already lourishing–periodical, FACTS 
Reports, landed on my desk a few months ago (in December 
2011), I was reminded of Hume’s insistence that neither our 
sentiments nor our practical reason can be taken to be a free- 
standing subject. The reading of facts has a critically im-
portant role in the formation of our feelings as well as in the 
development of our reasoning. Three centuries separate us 
today from David Hume’s birth in 1711, and last year–even 
as I started reading this admirable collection of essays–we 
were still celebrating the 300th anniversary of the birth of 
this central igure of European Enlightenment.1 It is particu-
larly important in our own time to take note of the inescap-
able connection between our knowledge and our reasons, 
including ethical reasons, and to appreciate the crucial role 
of our factual understanding in the formation of our commit-
ments, including our resolution to ight poverty.
1 Ethics, Altruism and Human Understanding
This ine collection of essays ends with an illuminating short 
contribution by Philippe Kourilsky, and his reasoning here 
draws on arguments that he has powerfully developed in his 
two ground-breaking books on the importance of altruism in 
our time, and the outlines of a manifesto to pursue what is so 
1 My own tribute to David Hume, on this occasion, came in my cen-
tennial lecture, “David Hume and the Demands of Ethics,” at the 
University of Edinburgh, which is published in a shortened form as 
“The Boundaries of Justice: David Hume and Our World,” The New 
Republic, December 29, 2012.
badly needed in the world today.2 Our comprehension of 
facts about the world in which we live, and about how it can 
 actually be changed, is central to Kourilsky’s analysis. In this 
 respect, Kourilsky is strongly in the tradition of Hume– 
afirming the importance of moral reasoning while refusing 
to take it to be a free-standing subject. Like Hume, Kourilsky 
too would not allow our ethics to be divorced from what we 
know, what we can reasonably expect, what we feel, what we 
have reason to consider, how our reasoning can come in 
many different forms, and how we should think about our 
obligations to a world which we can actually transform–in 
line with our reasoned values.
The collection of essays in this special issue contributes 
richly to that grand engagement, in the particular context of 
ighting poverty. What we know about the external world 
powerfully inluences our internal world of relections and 
sentiments. And our relected sentiments, in turn, have a pro-
found impact on our pursuit of ethics and practical reason.
The forceful bearing of our reading of facts on our senti-
ments and reasoning is a central feature of human under-
standing (to use one of Hume’s favourite terms), linking 
epistemology, psychology and moral philosophy. It would 
be hard to exaggerate the relevance of Hume’s approach to 
the philosophy behind the journal FACTS REPORTS and 
also to the motivation underlying the essays in this special 
issue. Our understanding of facts is crucial to our assess-
ment of what policies would–or would not–be appropriate, 
and to our practical reasoning in general.
Consider the idea of justice. The overarching concern in 
understanding justice is the need to avoid, to the extent we 
can, having unjust relations with others, and proceeding fur-
ther, to cultivate appropriate sentiments about others.3 What 
has fuelled passions about justice over the ages is the diagno-
sis of injustice in on-going arrangements–in distinct forms in 
different times–between people. We cannot, however, go any 
distance in this exercise without giving a central place to the 
reality that we can–however hesitantly–comprehend. Even 
though the methodology of on-going philosophy of science is 
2 Philippe Kourilsky, Le Temps de l’altruisme (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2009), 
and Le Manifeste de l’altruisme (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2011).
3 In this collection, Alain Supiot’s paper (“Poverty through the Prism of 
the Law”) touches on some closely related subjects in the understanding 
of poverty, focusing on issues of solidarity and injustice that are inescap-
ably linked with the diagnosis of poverty.
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much concerned with–and to some extent obsessed with–the 
presence of implicit values in our reading of facts, it is no less 
important to see the role of implicit facts in the determination 
of our values and commitments. Facts–or the reading of 
them–are indeed central to the formation of our values.
Let me give an illustration. In an important essay, called 
“Of Justice,” written in 1751, Hume discussed how our sense 
of justice inescapably expands as we come to know more–
often through growing relations of trade and commerce–
about people of whom we previously knew almost nothing. 
As a result, the spread of economic globalization enlarges 
the reach of our ethical ideas of justice. As Hume put it, 
“again suppose that several distinct societies maintain a kind 
of intercourse for mutual convenience and advantage, the 
boundaries of justice still grow larger, in proportion to the 
largeness of men’s views, and the force of their mutual 
connexions.”4 This “gradual enlargement of our regards to 
justice” comes about as a result of our coming to know about 
more facts–in particular facts about people who were effec-
tively unknown to us earlier.5 If we know nothing–or almost 
nothing–about a group of people, it is hard to talk about their 
needs, their entitlements, or their freedoms. We have good 
reason to pay attention to others as we acquire greater knowl-
edge of their lives, along with our growing connections with 
them. The dependence of ethics and moral sentiments on our 
knowledge about people and their lives, and about the reality 
of the impact that our actions can have, is as central to our 
ideas of justice, as it is to Philippe Kourilsky’s important 
concept of “altruity.”6
2 Importance of More Knowledge  
 and Understanding
The role of epistemology for practical reason is clearly an 
important motivating factor behind the new journal FACTS 
Reports. And in this special issue, the general engagement 
underlying the basket of problems that has been taken up–led 
by Jean-Claude Berthelemy (of Sorbonne) and David Menasce 
(the editor of this special issue)–is of extraordinary impor-
tance: how to ight poverty with more understanding, and in 
particular how to discern more fully the role of markets and 
gifts in that ight. Given the momentous theme and the qual-
ity of the contributions, we have very good reason to wel-
come this collection of essays on this important subject. I 
shall not attempt to summarize–or to comment on–these di-
verse articles on different aspects of this general topic. Their 
respective importance would be clear to the reader.
I will, however, use this opportunity to comment on two of 
the contributions in this collection to illustrate the general 
point about the centrality of facts with which I began–a 
4 The essay “Of Justice,” written in 1751, was published in Hume’s An 
Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals in 1777; republished, La 
Salle, Ill: Open Court, 1966, p. 25.
5 I have discussed this Humean issue in my essay “David Hume and 
Our World” (2011) and also the relevance of these connections for a 
theory of justice, in my book, The Idea of Justice (London: Penguin, 
and  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), Chapter 17.
6 See Kourilsky, Le Manifeste de l’altruisme (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2011).
subject that is closely linked with the idea of having a journal 
of this kind at all. Facts, including facts about poverty and 
about ways and means of ighting it, have importance of their 
own in human understanding, and so does the presence–often 
implicit–of facts in the nature of our values, including the 
value of combating poverty.
In her paper, Laurence Fontaine provides a critique of the 
reach of the market mechanism in ighting poverty.7 While 
most of the standard criticisms of the market economy tend 
to take the form of pointing to the distortions that market-
based incentives generate, or to the “externalities” that the 
market prices ignore, or to the inequities in capital owner-
ship that differential accumulation fosters, Fontaine takes 
quite a  different track in pointing to the exclusions from the 
vast beneits of the market mechanism that have been forced 
on ordinary people. The loss of participatory opportunities 
of the poor in the market mechanism is well illustrated and 
brilliantly discussed by Laurence Fontaine. The far-reaching 
impact of such banishment is one of the underinvestigated 
features of contemporary poverty analysis, and one hopes 
that Fontaine’s analysis in this essay, and her other publica-
tions, will help to remedy this neglect.
It is also important to investigate further the hopeful signs 
that Fontaine sees in such expanding phenomena as yard 
sales or car-boot sales, and the use of eBay and other auction 
websites, and in the development of micro-credit as a new 
market-related instrument. She notes in these evolutions the 
impact of “a desire on the part of ordinary people to take back 
ownership of the market,” but she goes on to note the coun-
teracting moves in the form of “the efforts being made by 
established vendors to shut off access to the market or to pre-
vent its expansion.” As we know from recent debates about 
the role and impact of micro-credit, these new moves and 
countermoves deserve much greater attention and scrutiny.8 
Laurence Fontaine has made a deinitive departure in leading 
further work on this underinvestigated aspect of ighting 
 poverty, and we have much reason to be grateful to her.
The other paper I will comment on is by Esther Dulo, 
“The Price is Wrong.” Providing commodities that are im-
portant for the lives of the poor but which the poor cannot 
afford to buy (or even ind in the regular markets) has an 
obvious role in ighting poverty. Good illustrations of such 
products can be found in insecticidal bednets, water disin-
fectants, and handwashing soap, to choose a few prominent 
examples. The question that immediately arises is whether 
such goods should be given away, free of cost, to the poor, or 
whether there should be a small charge. Based primarily on 
abstract reasoning, supplemented with rather incomplete 
 investigations, the development community has, to a great 
extent, come to accept the case for charging small fees to 
7 Laurence Fontaine, “Les enjeux du marche dans les strategies de survie 
des familles de l’Europe preindustrielle” (“The Inluence of the Market 
on Household Survival Strategies in Preindustrial Europe”).
8 One of the important papers in this collection is jointly authored by 
Muhammad Yunus (the pioneer of micro-credit in Bangladesh–and now 
across the world–in the form of Grameen Bank), along with Thierry 
 Sibieude, “Social Business and Big Business: Innovative, Promising 
 Solutions to Overcome Poverty?”
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combine an expansion of access with prevention of waste 
and facilitation of sustainability. Dulo presents a convinc-
ingly reasoned case for not falling for this increasingly com-
mon presumption, masquerading as “policy wisdom.” 
Based on a wide range of empirical studies, with random-
ized sampling, Esther Dulo comes to the conclusion that this 
policy wisdom is based largely on ignorance, rather than 
well-scrutinized knowledge. These small fees raise very little 
revenue, but dramatically reduce access to critically impor-
tant products for the poor. The procedure seems to deprive 
most particularly those whose need for these products is the 
greatest. It makes little contribution to preventing waste, and 
the prevalence of these small fees does not seem to enhance 
the future willingness of the erstwhile poor to pay for it more 
fully. There might, of course, be some other case for using the 
small-charge procedure (such as giving the providers more 
incentive to stock supplies), but it is not at all clear that these 
incentives cannot be more effectively built in other ways.
The overall impact of Dulo’s paper is a comprehensive de-
bunking of one of the most cherished illusions about policy 
wisdom. Since the procedure of charging small fees is now 
very widespread, and becoming more and more so, Dulo’s 
deinitive analysis provides a hugely important corrective of 
a common and growing practice–based on more knowledge 
and a far-reaching analysis of facts. This is a remarkable con-
tribution to the literature on development practice, founded 
on well collected and well investigated data, and truly astute 
policy analysis.
Before I end, I would want to record my belief that David 
Hume would have felt vindicated by the excellent examples in 
this collection of essays of the way practical reason and policy 
making can be immensely enriched by robust factual analysis. 
Well-researched factual analysis does, of course, have signii-
cance of its own (for knowledge has its own value), but it can 
also be critically important for the lowering of moral and po-
litical reasoning. The need for pursuing the epistemic roots of 
ethics and of policy making has never been greater.
